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PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY AND THE 
NECESSITY OF IDENTITY 
Robert Francescotti 
I 
In attempting to understand personal 
identity, it is common practice to imagine 
a person existing at some time t (x at t) and 
a person existing at a time t* (y at t*), and 
then to ask, 
What does it take for person x at t to be the same 
person as person y at t*? 
The Psychological Continuity Approach 
(hereafter PC A) answers: 
there is a relation, R, of psychological continu 
ity such that person x at t is the same person 
as person y at t* if and only if x at t bears R 
toy att*.1 
But maybe the question above is not the 
right one to ask when trying to understand 
personal identity. Olson (1997, p. 25) calls 
this the narrow question of personal identity, 
which he distinguishes from the broad ques 
tion: 
What does it take for person x at t to be the same 
individual as y at t*? 
One reason Olson focuses on the broad ques 
tion is that it leaves open whether a person can 
continue to exist without being a person.2 We 
should not preclude at the outset the possibil 
ity of our having once existed without any 
person-making psychological features (e.g., 
as a fetus at some sufficiently early stage) or 
of a person continuing to exist after the loss 
?2010 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 
of those features (e.g., in a vegetative state). 
So, Olson concludes, when inquiring about 
our persistence conditions, the broad question 
is the one we should ask. And as a response 
to the broad question, PCA tells us that 
there is a relation, R, of psychological continu 
ity such that person x at t is the same individual 
as y at t* if and only if x at t bears R to y at 
t* 
which allows that a person might have existed 
at an earlier time or might exist at a later 
time without being a person at that time. It is 
not necessary here to decide which of these 
two questions is the more important one to 
ask when thinking about personal identity. 
The worry presented here for PCA arises 
whether the account is meant to answer the 
broad question or intended only to answer 
the narrow question. So long as "same" in 
our formulation of PCA means "numerically 
identical," the problem presented in this es 
say remains. 
Of course, in its most historically influen 
tial version, PCA already faces well-known 
objections. Thanks to Locke, psychological 
relation R is most commonly understood in 
terms of memory. Suppose that a person at 
one time is able to remember many of the 
thoughts and actions of a person at some 
earlier time, and remember them as thoughts 
and actions of herself. Then, on a memory 
construal of relation R, PCA gives the result 
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that the individual at the later time is the same 
person as the one at the earlier time. Now, 
the most obvious difficulty with understand 
ing personal identity in terms of memory 
is that it seems possible for one to remain 
the same person while having no memories 
of one's life at some earlier time (as Reid's 
famous Brave Officer example shows). So an 
important question for a memory theorist is 
whether there are suitable indirect memory 
connections that might constitute a person's 
persistence conditions. Is there a type of 
psychological continuity in Parfit's sense, i.e., 
overlapping chains of direct psychological 
connections, that might plausibly be thought 
necessary for remaining the same person?3 
Another well-known concern for memory 
versions of PC A is that one can have a mem 
ory of doing something that someone else did. 
This possibility raises the issue of whether we 
can characterize the act of remembering in a 
way that rules out pseudomemories without 
making the analysis circular?i.e., without 
requiring that the person who recollects doing 
the deed is the same person as the one who 
actually did it.4 
For the sake of the present discussion, it is 
left open whether either of these major dif 
ficulties is a serious obstacle to the success of 
memory versions of PCA. Even if there is no 
grave threat here to memory accounts, there 
remains a different worry that has not been 
widely discussed in the literature. The problem 
presented below deserves serious attention, 
since it applies not only to versions of PCA that 
appeal to memory links, but also to versions 
that rely on psychological connections of other 
types. It will be shown that regardless of the 
type of psychological continuity invoked, PCA 
conflicts with the doctrine of the Necessity of 
Identity (NI)?the idea that genuine identity 
is never contingent. 
The conflict with NI is described in sections 
III and IV. But before getting to that, let us 
first see what a version of PCA would have 
to entail to be compatible with NI. 
II 
"Augusta is the capital of Maine" is con 
tingently true; the capital of Maine might 
have been some city other than Augusta. This 
does not mean, however, that Augusta is only 
contingently identical with itself, for we can 
hold that "is" occurs in the sentence "Augusta 
is the capital of Maine" as an "is" of predica 
tion and not an "is" of identity. In that case, 
we would interpret the sentence as claiming 
only that Augusta exemplifies the property of 
being the capital of Maine, thereby allowing 
that it plays this role contingently, while also 
insisting that the city is necessarily identical 
with itself. So from the contingency of "Au 
gusta is the capital of Maine" we cannot infer 
that the identity relation sometimes holds 
contingently. Indeed, there is good reason to 
think that identity cannot hold contingently; 
that is, 
(NI) for any objects x and y, if x = y, then nec 
essarily x 
= 
y. 
For suppose that x = y. Given that x is neces 
sarily identical with x and the Indiscernibility 
of Identicals, it seems to follow that x is 
necessarily identical with y.5 
The formulation of PCA offered at the 
start of this essay does not contain any modal 
terminology. Yet as a conceptual analysis of 
personal identity, PCA is certainly meant to 
report on more than just what happens to be 
the case while one remains the same person. 
It also aims to specify what must be the case 
to be the same person. Obviously, then, in 
formulating PCA, a necessity operator is 
required. The theory requires at least that the 
following is true: 
(1) necessarily, for any persons, x and y, and 
times, t and t*, x at t = y at t* only if x at t bears 
R to y at t*,6 
where R is whatever psychological relation 
is supposed to yield the identity of persons. 
However, PCA will have to entail more than 
(1) if it is to honor NI. (1) entails that there is 
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no possible world where x is the same person 
as y without bearing R to y, but it does allow 
that x bears R to y in one possible world 
and not in some other possible world, and 
therefore that x is the same person as y in 
one possible world and not the same person 
as y in another. 
To be compatible with NI, PCA will need 
to specify transworld persistence conditions, 
requiring that 
(2) necessarily, for any persons, x and y, and 
times, t and t*, x at t = y at t* only if necessarily 
x at t bears R to y at t*.7 
As with (1), (2) entails that there is no pos 
sible world where x is the same person as 
y without bearing R to y. But thanks to the 
embedded necessity operator, (2) also entails 
that if person x bears R to y in one possible 
world, then x bears R to y in every other pos 
sible world at which x and y exist. So (2) does 
not allow that identity holds contingently.8 
We will consider various candidates for re 
lation R in sections III and IV to see if any of 
them yields a true instance of (2). It is argued 
that they do not. But before turning to that dis 
cussion, a brief note about the endurantism/ 
perdurantism debate is in order. According 
to endurantism, an individual is wholly pres 
ent at each point in the individual's career, 
which entails that one's persistence through 
time consists in one's being wholly present 
throughout that period. If this view is correct, 
then it is perfectly appropriate to talk about 
an individual at one time being numerically 
identical with an individual at some other 
time. However, if the perdurantist is right, 
then what exists at any one moment in the 
life of a persisting object is not the object as 
a whole, but only a temporal part. On this 
view, if t and t* are distinct times, then x-at-t 
and y-at-t* are distinct temporal parts of the 
object. They are temporal parts of the same 
temporally extended object, but the parts 
themselves are distinct. So the perdurantist 
advocate of PCA does not seek to explain 
what makes a person at one time identical 
with an individual at some other time, but 
instead aims to explain what makes those 
different temporal parts parts of the same 
(identical) person, which means that the per 
durantist would not accept (2), and need not 
accept (2) to honor NI.9 It might be thought, 
then, that only endurantist versions of PCA 
conflict with NI. 
However, in section V it is argued that the 
conflict with NI described in sections III and 
IV is also a problem for the perdurantist advo 
cate of PCA. But for ease of exposition, let us 
postpone further discussion of perdurantism 
until then. The conflict with NI presented in III 
and IV is couched in endurantist terms; there 
I shall speak of a person at one time being 
identical with a person at some other time. 
Ill 
Suppose that body x of some person at 
some time, t, is spatio-temporally continuous 
with body y at a later time, t*. Suppose also 
that the memories housed in body y are con 
nected, as strongly as you like, to the thoughts 
and actions of body x. While a memory 
connection actually does obtain in this case, 
it seems that this memory connection could 
have failed to obtain. Even if a body at one 
time actually houses psychological states that 
relate it memory-wise to a body at some other 
time, it is certainly not necessary that they 
are related in this way. Whatever memories 
a body happens to store are not essential to 
that body; it might have had very different 
memories, or none at all, while remaining 
the same body. So it seems that whatever 
memories connect body x with body y, it 
is possible for x and y to be the same body 
without these memory connections. 
The same seems to apply to the person, and 
not just the constituent body.10 While it is far 
from clear how exactly our life experiences 
could have been different while being the 
same person (and not just the same body), it 
does seem that some significant differences 
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might have occurred. For instance, you could 
have met someone who inspired you to pursue 
a career in architecture rather than philoso 
phy. Then you (the person) would have had 
a very different set of experiences than what 
you actually had. Your encounters would have 
differed?different classes, teachers, friends, 
and projects. As a result, your thoughts, 
beliefs, and desires, along with the behavior 
caused by these, would also have differed, and 
all of these differences would have produced 
memories very different from those you actu 
ally acquired.11 It seems that where relation 
R is understood in terms of memory, R does 
not connect yourself in the counterfactual 
case just described to the way you actually 
are now. So it seems that the memory relation 
contingently connects your actual present self 
with how you actually were in the past. 
So where R is the memory relation, the 
following appears to be false: 
(3) for any persons, x and y, and times, t and 
t*, x at t bears R to y at t* only if necessarily x 
at t bears R to y at t*. 
Given PCA, if (3) is false, then (2) is also 
false?i.e., it is then false that person x at t 
is identical with y and t* only if necessarily 
x at t bears R to y at t*. But if (2) is false, 
then given PCA, NI is false as well. So if (3) 
is false, as it seems to be, then the proponent 
of PCA forfeits NI. 
One might bite the bullet at this point and 
insist that things could not have gone any 
differently for a person so that the person 
is not related memory-wise, in any other 
possible world where she exists, to the way 
she actually was or is. However, this view 
places severe limitations on the ways our 
lives could have gone, limitations that seem 
unreasonable. On this view, you or I could not 
have met anyone who inspired us to pursue 
a career in architecture, astronomy, music, 
or real estate?or at least, we could not have 
pursued such alternative paths with memories 
(discontinuous with those we have actually 
acquired) that these alternatives would nor 
mally produce. This result is hard to believe, 
even for advocates of PCA. PCA theorists 
would have to admit that the experiences we 
have at one time in our lives can greatly differ 
from those we have at other times. So it seems 
they have no good reason to deny that at any 
one time we could have had experiences dif 
ferent from those we actually do have at that 
time.12 Differences in experience normally 
lead to differences in memory. So it seems 
that even if memory links relate one stage 
of a person's life with other actual stages of 
that person's life, there is no good reason to 
think these memory relations will always 
hold between the actual stages of a person's 
life and the various ways that person's life 
could have been. In other words, even if it is 
true that memory relations connect the vari 
ous stages of a person's life within possible 
worlds, it seems implausible to think that they 
always do so across possible worlds. To honor 
NI, an advocate of PCA needs to endorse (2), 
which tells us that relation R binds a person 
at one time in one possible world to the per 
son at any time in any other possible world. 
However, where R consists in memory links, 
it is doubtful that (2) is true. It seems that the 
very same person who actually had one set 
of life experiences might have had different 
experiences and thereby might have acquired 
memories that are not continuous with those 
she actually acquired. 
Of course, a memory account of personal 
identity does not have a chance of success 
if it relies on direct links between actual 
memories. To accommodate the various ways 
in which a person forgets (while remaining 
the same person), expressing the requisite 
memory relations takes some ingenuity. Ob 
viously, these memory connections cannot 
be restricted to what one actually recollects, 
for there are many occasions when one is 
not actually recollecting any of the stages of 
one's former life. We need to allow that (i) 
the memory connections include potential 
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memories, what one would remember under 
suitable conditions. Also, we might follow 
Quinton (1962, p. 398) and require only that 
(ii) a person at any one time of her life is 
related to various other moments of her life 
by a series of memory links rather than one 
direct connection.13 This amounts to saying, 
as Shoemaker (1984, p. 81) puts it, "that 
two stages belong to the same person if and 
only if they are the end-points of a series of 
stages such that each member of the series 
is memory-connected with the preceding 
member."14 We might wish to allow for even 
weaker memory links, as does Grice (1941, 
p. 343), who proposes that (iii) each point in 
a person's career is memory-linked to either 
a preceding or a subsequent moment. This 
proposal, Perry (1975, pp. 19-20) notes, 
handles the case of the Senile General who 
can remember boyhood events but not his 
officer days. 
However, despite these emendations, the 
threat of violating NI remains. Consider each 
of the actual moments of someone's life, 
stretching from t to t+n, and suppose that 
this series enjoys just the sort of continuity 
of memories described by (i)-(iii). Keeping 
in mind the variety of different ways our lives 
could have gone (different classes, teachers, 
friends, and projects, producing different 
thoughts, beliefs, desires, and behavior, in 
addition to all of the differences in memories 
that would result), it seems quite clear that 
there are many counterfactual moments of 
one's life at some time, say t+n/2, that are 
not related to the actual moments of one's life 
in the manner described by (i)-(iii). It seems 
that things could have gone differently in 
my life so that in some other possible world 
at which I exist I am now reflecting on, for 
example, the previous experiences in my life 
as a bartender, a job that I reluctantly sought 
after failing to get an academic position 
after my arduous study of art history (none 
of which actually occurred). Take each mo 
ment of my actual history up to the present 
and replace the last in this series with the 
counterf actual reflective stage just described. 
Now we have a series the last of which lacks 
even potential memories of the previous mo 
ments. 
So it seems that even a sophisticated 
memory version of PCA fails to make (3) 
true; i.e., the memory relation that is supposed 
to be essential to personal identity still fails 
to hold with necessity. It is not clear how a 
memory account could be revised any further 
than (i)-(iii) to avoid this result. So the threat 
of violating NI remains.15 
IV 
We could have had psychological features 
different from those we actually do or did 
have. That is why (3) and therefore (2) seem 
false where R is understood in terms of 
memory. That is also why (3) and therefore 
(2) appear to be false with other candidates 
for relation R. Clearly, the body might have 
had wildly different personality traits while 
being the same body. This seems to be true 
of the person, too. We certainly wish to allow 
that a person's life experiences could have 
gone a bit and perhaps quite a bit differently, 
differently enough that one's personality in 
some counterfactual scenario is not continu 
ous in a suitable way with one's actual per 
sonality at the time or with the personality 
one actually has had in the past or will have 
in the future. Marty's life experiences could 
have been other than what they actually are, 
and these different experiences might have 
lead to personality traits different from those 
he actually did acquire. With more success 
ful relationships, less critical bosses, and 
a few nurturing friends, Marty could have 
been more optimistic, self-confident, pas 
sionate about life, and in general had a life 
much happier than the one he has actually 
had. 
To honor NI, the proponent of PCA needs 
to accept (2)?the claim that relation R binds 
a person at one time in one possible world 
This content downloaded from 130.191.17.38 on Mon, 28 Jul 2014 17:44:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
342 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 
with the person at any time in any other 
possible world. But compare Marty in the 
counterfactual case described above with how 
things actually turned out for him. Where R 
is continuity of personality traits, R does not 
obtain in this case. Even if Marty today actu 
ally is continuous personality-wise to the way 
he is at other times in his actual career, he is 
not psychologically continuous in this way 
to stages of the counterfactual self described 
above. It seems, then, that while continuity 
of personality actually holds between the 
current and prior stages of Marty's life, it 
holds contingently. So it seems that when R 
is understood as continuity of personality, (3) 
is false?i.e., it is false that for any persons, x 
and y, and times, t and t*, x at t bears R to y 
at t* only if necessarily x at t bears R to y at 
t*. But if (3) is false, then so is (2). So, again, 
the proponent of PCA seems to forfeit NI. 
The result is the same when R is continuity 
of intentions or narrative unity. The typical 
person could have had different intentions 
in the past from those he or she actually did 
have. Circumstances could have differed so 
that in college you decided to take a differ 
ent major or perhaps skip college altogether 
and turn to a life of crime. So the intentions a 
person actually does have at the present time 
need not be continuous with those that the 
person could have had at that time or other 
times in her life. Regarding narrative unity, 
since a person could have differed in terms of 
past experiences, the result could have been 
different memories, intentions, and personal 
ity traits, and therefore the person might have 
made sense of herself with a narrative that is 
discontinuous with any narrative the person 
actually did construct.16 
One might insist that things could not have 
gone differently for us so that we are not 
continuous in terms of personality or narra 
tive unity in other possible worlds where we 
exist with the way we actually are. But this 
view places severe limitations on the ways 
our lives could have gone, limitations that 
seem unreasonable. The idea that you or I 
could not have had different experiences, 
which produced different intentions or dif 
ferent narratives to make sense of our lives, 
is hard to believe. Even proponents of PCA 
would have to admit that the experiences we 
have at one time in our lives can greatly dif 
fer from those we have at other times. But if 
this is granted, then it seems there is no good 
reason to deny that at any one time we could 
have had experiences very different from 
those we actually did have at that time.17 And 
with these differences in experience, there 
are likely to be great differences in intentions 
and self-narratives. So it seems that viewing 
the R-relation in terms of either continuity of 
intentions or narrative unity also makes (3) 
dubious, and this, again, undermines (2). 
Might there be some sufficiently sophisti 
cated appeal to continuity of personality, or 
continuity of intentions, or narrative unity, 
that makes (3) true? I think there is reason to 
be suspicious. Recall the suggestions, men 
tioned in section III, about how a simplistic 
memory version of PCA might be emended 
to account for the various ways in which a 
person forgets, and let us imagine analogues 
of these for the R-relations discussed in 
this section. Let us require that (i*) these 
R-relations need not actually be conscious 
and need not actually manifest themselves 
in behavior, but only that they would affect 
behavior and consciously so under suitable 
conditions. Also suppose that we include 
indirect connections of personality, inten 
tions, or narrative unity so that (ii*) person 
x is identical with y if x and y are R-related 
by a series of psychological links. We might 
also wish to weaken (ii*) to allow that (hi*) 
each stage in a person's career is R-related, in 
terms of personality, intentions, or narrative 
unity, to either a preceding or a subsequent 
stage. 
Given the variety of different ways our 
lives could have gone, it seems that there are 
many counterfactual stages of one's life that 
This content downloaded from 130.191.17.38 on Mon, 28 Jul 2014 17:44:21 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CONTINUITY AND IDENTITY / 343 
are not related to the actual stages of one's 
life in the manner described by either (i*), 
(ii*), or (iii*). I might have chosen to spend 
more time in my childhood with Jack instead 
of Jill, which would have led to meeting dif 
ferent students in high school, sparking an 
interest in becoming a firefighter, causing 
me to pursue training in this field instead of a 
degree in philosophy, and as a result meeting 
and eventually marrying so-and-so, with the 
tumultuous relationship that ensued, result 
ing in failing my firefighter training, leading 
to unemployment, poverty, and eventually a 
life of crime ... all of which is quite differ 
ent from the way my life has actually gone. 
It seems that the personality, intentions, and 
narrative unity I would have acquired in this 
counterfactual scenario are such that I am not, 
in that case, R-related in ways (i*)-(iii*) with 
the actual stages of my life. 
Suppose we combine a few, or more, dif 
ferent respects of psychological continuity? 
continuity of memory, intentions, personality 
traits, and narrative unity. On this view, x and 
y are the same person only if x and y are con 
tinuous in each of these ways (assuming no 
branching has occurred). But, clearly, if each 
of these psychological relations holds only 
contingently, then so does any conjunction 
of them; for any relation rv if r{ contingently 
binds x and y, then for any relation, r2, the 
conjunctive relation r1 & r2 contingently binds 
x and y. As shown above, it seems that for 
each of these ways to understand relation R, 
R connects a person with other actual stages 
of his or her life only contingently. 
Suppose that instead of conjoining the vari 
ous R relations, we disjoin them. While we 
are at it, let us add some more psychological 
traits to the mix. On this view, for x and y to 
be the same person, it is enough that x and y 
are connected in any of the various ways that 
might be considered definitive of personal 
identity?in terms of memory, or personality, 
or intentions, or narrative unity, or prefer 
ences, or habits, or character, etc.18 But recall 
the counterfactual firefighter scenario above 
and the counterfactual "self-reflective" case 
described near the end of section III. In both 
cases, it is reasonable to suppose that there 
are counterfactual moments of the person's 
life that are not continuous either in terms of 
memory, or personality, or intentions, or nar 
rative unity, or preferences, or habits, or char 
acter to the actual stages of the person's life. 
It seems, then, that no collection (conjunctive 
or disjunctive) of the psychological relations 
that might be thought definitive of personal 
identity makes (3) true.19 At least, the burden 
is on the advocate of PCA to prove otherwise. 
And if (3) cannot be supported, then given 
PCA, (2) is indefensible as well, in which case 
the proponent of PCA seems to forfeit NI. 
One might wonder whether the conflict 
between PCA and NI noted here applies only 
to endurantist versions of PCA. In the next 
section, it will be argued that it does not. 
V 
If the perdurantist is right, then what exists 
at any one moment in the life of a persisting 
object is not the object as a whole, but only 
a temporal part. If t and t* are distinct times, 
then x-at-t and y-at-t* are distinct temporal 
parts of the object. They are temporal parts 
of the same temporally extended, 4-D object, 
but the parts themselves are distinct. So per 
durantist advocates of PCA do not seek to 
explain what makes a person at one time the 
same (identical) person as a person at some 
other time; instead, they aim to explain what 
makes those distinct temporal parts parts of 
the same person. Thus, perdurantist support 
ers of PCA would not accept (2) and need not 
accept (2) to endorse NI. To honor NI they 
need not accept the following either: 
(2p) any person-stages, x-at-t and y-at-t*, are 
temporal parts of the same person only if neces 
sarily x-at-t bears R to y-at-t*. 
Allowing that R holds contingently between 
x-at-t and y-at-t* amounts to allowing that 
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x-at-t and y-at-t* are parts of the same person 
contingently, and not that they are identical 
contingently. It might appear, then, that the 
perdurantist advocate of PCA avoids the 
conflict with NI described in sections III 
and IV. 
The conflict, however, is not completely 
avoided. While perdurantist advocates of 
PCA need not accept either (2) or (2p) to 
honor NI, by endorsing NI they are com 
mitted to the following restricted version of 
(2p): 
(2p=) x-at-t and y-at-t* are temporal parts of 
the same person and x-at-t 
= 
y-at-t* only if 
necessarily x-at-t bears R to y-at-t*.20 
Why does accepting NI commit them to 
(2p=)? Well, the symbols "x," "y," "t," and 
"t*" in the formulations above obviously are 
meant to be variables; and as is customary, 
tokens of two distinct variable-types can be 
used to refer to the very same thing; e.g., 
while "t" and "t*" are often used to designate 
different times, they can, of course, also be 
used to refer to the same time. Now suppose 
that perdurantism is true and that "x-at-t" 
and "y-at-t*" are used to designate the same 
temporal part of a person. It is trivially true 
that numerically identical parts are parts of 
the same thing. So when x-at-t is identical 
with y-at-t*, x-at-t and y-at-t* are temporal 
parts of the same person. According to a per 
durantist version of PCA, x-at-t and y-at-t* 
are temporal parts of the same person only 
if they are R-related. So given PCA, the fact 
that x-at-t is identical with y-at-t* entails that 
they are R-related (and in that case, they are 
R-related in the strongest possible sense: by 
being indistinguishable, since every tempo 
ral part is indistinguishable from itself). Of 
course, if NI is true, then if x-at-t and y-at-t* 
are identical, they are necessarily identical. 
Given PCA, it follows that if x-at-t and y-at-t* 
are identical, then they are necessarily R 
related. For if x-at-t could fail to be R-related 
to y-at-t*, then they could fail to be stages of 
the same person. But numerically identical 
person-stages could not fail to be stages of 
same person. So if x-at-t and y-at-t* could 
fail to be stages of the same person, then they 
could fail to be identical, contrary to NI. So 
their being necessarily identical entails that 
they are necessarily R-related, given PCA. 
To rehearse the line of argument: suppose 
that 
(i) a and b are temporal parts of a person 
and also suppose that 
(ii) a is identical with b, 
i.e., a and b are the same temporal part. This 
temporal part might be the whole of the 
continuant person, where "a" and "Z?" both 
designate the improper temporal part of the 
continuant person?perhaps the instanta 
neous stage of an instantaneous person, or 
the day-long stage of a day-long person, or 
the ninety-year-long stage of a person lasting 
ninety years. In each case, not only would a 
and b be the same temporal part of a person; 
they would also be the same person. However, 
this supposition is not crucial to the present 
line of argument. We need only suppose that 
a is identical with b, whether this is a proper 
temporal part or the improper temporal part 
of a continuant person. 
Now, it is trivially true that 
(iii) necessarily, numerically identical person 
parts (temporal or spatial) are parts of the same 
person; \J[a = b ?> PSPab]. 
Also, given PCA, if a and b are temporal parts 
of the same person, then they are R-related. 
This is meant to be a necessary truth, since 
PCA purports to give necessary (and also 
sufficient) conditions for being stages of the 
same person (or necessary and sufficient 
conditions for being the same person on an 
endurantist reading). So a perdurantist ver 
sion of PCA entails that 
(iv) necessarily, if a and b are temporal parts 
of the same person, then a and b are R-related; 
[PSP^-^R^]. 
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From (iii) and (iv) it follows that 
(v) necessarily, if a is identical with b, then a 
and b are R-related; = b ?? Rafr]. 
Given NI, it follows from (ii) that 
(vi) a is necessarily identical with b;Oa = b, 
which together with (v) entails that 
(vii) necessarily, a is R-related to b\ [JRab. 
This shows that a perdurantist advocate of 
PCA who accepts NI cannot consistently 
deny (2p=)?i.e., cannot deny that if a and b 
are temporal parts of the same person, and the 
same temporal part, then a and b are neces 
sarily R-related. 
However, the discussion in sections III 
and IV shows that a person at one time, due 
to different life experiences, could have 
had very different psychological properties 
at that time, and these possible differences 
seem great enough to show that (2p=) is 
false. The possible psychological differences 
seem to be such that a person at a time is not 
R-related to all the ways the person could 
have been at that time, which means that 
even if a and b actually are R-related, they 
are not necessarily R-related.21 However, if 
(2p=) were false, then on a perdurantist ver 
sion of PCA, NI would be false as well. So a 
perdurantist version of PCA does not avoid 
the conflict with NI described in sections III 
and IV. 
VI 
Let us summarize the results of this discus 
sion. According to an endurantist construal of 
PCA, there is a psychological relation, R, in 
virtue of which a person x at time t is numeri 
cally identical with y at time t*. Assuming, 
also, that NI is true, R will be a relation that 
necessarily holds between x and y?a relation 
that x bears to y in all possible worlds where x 
and y exist. So in order to consistently accept 
NI, the endurantist proponent of PCA needs 
to hold that 
(2) necessarily, for any persons, x and y, and 
times, t and t*, x at t = y at t* only if necessarily 
x at t bears R to y at t*. 
Typical candidates for relation R were 
considered here. For each of these, it seems 
to be false that 
(3) for any persons, x and y, and times, t and 
t*, x at t bears R to y at t* only if necessarily x 
at t bears R to y at t*. 
There is reason to think that not only bodies, 
but also the persons they constitute, could 
have had very different experiences. Since 
differences in experience may lead to dif 
ferences in memory, intentions, personality 
traits, preferences, habits, and character, it 
seems that relation R does not link how we 
actually are to all the ways we could have 
been. Perhaps there is some other brand of 
psychological continuity, one not considered 
here, that makes (3) true, thereby allowing 
that (2) is true as well. Whether there actually 
is remains to be seen, but given our discussion 
of the typical candidates, there certainly is 
reason to be suspicious. 
A perdurantist advocate of PCA will not 
accept (2), and need not do so to honor NI, 
as noted in section V. However, there it was 
argued that this does not eliminate the threat 
of forfeiting NI. On a perdurantist reading of 
PCA, allowing that R holds contingently be 
tween x-at-t and y-at-t* amounts to allowing 
that x-at-t and y-at-t* are parts of the same 
person contingently. This does not entail that 
x-at-t and y-at-t* are identical contingently? 
unless they are the same temporal part. In 
that case, if relation R holds contingently, 
then given PCA so does the identity relation. 
But it seems that R does hold contingently 
even when x-at-t = y-at-t*, for it seems that 
a person at one time could have had very dif 
ferent psychological states at that time, ones 
that are discontinuous with those the person 
actually has at that time. So it seems that the 
risk of forfeiting NI remains. 
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The problem presented here deserves seri 
ous consideration, since it applies not only 
to versions of PCA that appeal to memory 
links, but also to versions (endurantist or 
perdurantist) that rely on mental connec 
tions of other types. It has been argued that 
regardless of the type of mental continuity 
that might be thought definitive of being the 
same person, PCA conflicts with NI. Whether 
the specific problems of the various individual 
versions of PCA can be solved, the general 
worry presented here remains. Of course, it 
is perfectly open to proponents of PCA to 
reject the well-established NI, which would 
require some strong independent justification. 
Otherwise, they will need to convince us that 
the psychological ways we could have been 
are far more limited than we are inclined to 
believe.22 
San Diego State University 
NOTES 
1. To be sufficient for being the same person, relation R must be understood as nonbranching psycho 
logical continuity. This is to handle cases of fission. 
2. Olson also claims that the broad question is what psychological continuity theorists mean to ad 
dress, for they "claim that one ceases to exist if one's mind is destroyed, not merely that one ceases to 
be a person." The theory "purports to tell us what it takes for one of us to survive . . . simpliciter, not 
merely what it takes for one of us to survive as a person" (1997, p. 26). 
3. SeeParfit(1984,p. 206). 
4. Perry (1975, Ch. 9: "Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem of Circularity") tries to avoid 
this circularity worry by appealing to the notion of memories caused in the right way (i.e., there being 
a suitable causal mechanism connecting the memory to the original experience of the event). Also, see 
Shoemaker (1984, p. 83). 
5. See Marcus (1961) and Kripke (1971). 
6. The reason for emphasis on "only if" and not "if and only if" in (1)?and (2), (3), (2p), and (2p=) to 
follow?is that this essay concerns what is necessary, given PCA and NI, for being the same person. 
7. Both (1) and (2) answer what Olson calls the narrow question of personal identity; both concern 
what makes a person at t identical with a person at t*. This is not meant to presuppose that the narrow 
rather than the broad question is the more important one to ask. For if we can show that (2) is false, for 
some relation R, then we will also have shown that the answer to the broad question is false as well; if 
(2) is false, then it is also false that for any person x at t and any individual y at t*, x at t = y at t* only 
if necessarily x at t bears R to y at t*. 
8. Those who reject the idea of transworld identity in favor of counterpart theory make sense of 
the difference between having features necessarily or only contingently in terms of which properties 
are exemplified, not by oneself, but by one's counterparts at other possible worlds. (2) will then be 
interpreted as claiming that person x = person y if and only if in every possible world at which x has a 
person-counterpart and so does y, the person-counterpart of x at that world is R-related to the person 
counterpart of y at that world. (The emphasis on person-counterparts is to allow that a person exists, 
i.e., a counterpart of a person exists, at some possible world without being a person at that world.) 
9. For the perdurantist, the formulation of PCA given at the start of this essay should be changed to 
read: there is a relation, R, of psychological continuity such that person-stage x-at-t is a temporal part 
of the same person as y-at-t* if and only if x-at-t bears R to y-at-t* (or as an answer to what Olson calls 
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the broad question: person-stage x-at-t is a temporal part of the same individual as y-at-t* if and only 
if x at t bears R to y-at-t*). 
10. It is tempting to think that each person is identical with a body?a body endowed with person 
making properties. However, many believe otherwise. Some believe that a person is an immaterial 
substance. Others think that while each person is constituted entirely by a body, there is a difference 
between constitution and identity. The person and the constituent body seem to have different persis 
tence conditions: the person can continue to exist without the former body, e.g., in the brain-transplant 
case, and the body can continue to exist without the former person. It is arguable that the difference in 
persistence conditions shows that the person is not identical with the constituent body, just as a differ 
ence in persistence conditions might be thought to show that a statue is not identical with the constituent 
lump of marble or clay. 
11. See Campbell's (2000) intricate discussion of the various difficulties that arise for a psychological 
account of personal identity when it comes to the intuition that we could have led different mental lives. 
As Campbell expresses the intuition, "I could have been sold into slavery at an early age, and have 
grown up in a very different culture. Or I might have had a mystical experience at fifteen, and become 
a monk.... I could have won a lottery and become a decadent multi-millionaire. And so on" (p. 37). 
Unlike Campbell's essay, the discussion here focuses on how exactly this intuition conflicts with NI in 
particular. 
12. Suppose an advocate of PCA accepts mereological essentialism, according to which, concrete 
particulars have all of their parts essentially. In that case, the idea that a person could not have been 
very different mentally might seem perfectly welcome. However, even if we were to accept the highly 
counterintuitive doctrine of mereological essentialism, this should not lead us to deny that we could 
have been very different mentally. It seems possible (certainly logically, but also metaphysically and 
even physically) for a person to undergo great mental changes without losing or gaining any parts; 
the difference in mentality might be due to, e.g., differences in the way the parts are interrelated or 
differences in the external objects toward which one's intentional states are directed. Further, it seems 
at least metaphysically possible for a person to be an indivisible substance?e.g., an immaterial soul, 
or perhaps a microscopic part of one's brain, as Chisholm (1989, p. 126) suggests. If persons were 
indivisible, then their mental changes would occur without a loss of parts, since they would have no 
parts to lose. 
13. Quinton talks of continuity of memory and continuity of character. Psychological relations other 
than memory are discussed in the next section. 
14. Talk of "person-stages" does not automatically commit one to perdurantism. As Shoemaker notes, 
"Person-stages can be thought of as 'temporal slices,' not of persons, but of the histories or careers of 
persons" (1984, p. 75). 
15. A nonbranching constraint does not help here, since in the case described above, we need not suppose 
that any fission has occurred. Note also that to avoid the circularity problem mentioned in section II 
(the issue of characterizing the act of remembering in a way which does not presuppose that the person 
who recollects doing the deed is the same person as the one who actually did it), it is not uncommon 
to impose a causal constraint (see note 4). This causal constraint does not help with the threat to NI; it 
actually imposes an additional worry, since the causal requirement will be satisfied only within worlds, 
i.e., a counterfactual stage is not causally connected in any way with stages of one's actual history. 
16. Yet narrative accounts of personal "identity" are often not meant to explain the strict numerical 
identity of persons over time. For example, Schechtman's (1996) narrative account is not meant to 
address the "reidentification question" of strict identity over time, but the "characterization question," 
concerned with "which characteristics are truly attributable to a person" (p. 76)?characteristics that 
are truly hers in the sense of being those most central to making her the person she is. And Flanagan's 
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(1996) narrative account is meant to describe "the sort of connectedness that constitutes a normatively 
acceptable self or life" (p. 67). 
17. See the points about mereological essentialism in note 12. 
18. Shoemaker proposes that "memory continuity is now seen as just a special case of psychological 
continuity, and it is in psychological continuity that personal identity is now held to consist" (1984, p. 
90). 
19. The phrase, "that might be thought definitive of personal identity," is included because it is argu 
able that there are certain very general relations that are essential to being the same person. Consider 
the relational property, being alike in terms of having rationality, or the even more general, being 
alike in terms of having psychological states. If persons are essentially rational or essentially bearers 
of consciousness (both of which are controversial), then (3) is true. However, neither of these overly 
broad relations is definitive of personal identity, since both are obviously insufficient for being the same 
person. So what is doubtful is that any R or collection of Rs that is necessary for being the same person 
is also sufficient for being the same person. 
Lynne Baker contends that x is the same person as y just in case x and y share the same first-person 
perspective, where a first-person perspective is "a perspective from which one thinks of oneself as an 
individual facing a world, as a subject distinct from everything else" (2000, p. 60). One might argue that 
having the same first-person perspective is necessary for being the same person, in which case, (3) would 
be true where R is having the same first-person perspective. However, it is doubtful that this would be 
necessary unless the notion of a first-perspective is defined in a way that entails being the same person. 
Indeed, Baker admits that she "cannot give noncircular conditions under which a first-person perspective 
considered at one time is the same first-person perspective as a first-person perspective considered at 
another time" (2000, p. 132). So, strictly speaking, what is doubtful is that any R that is both necessary 
and sufficient for being the same person can provide a noncircular account of personal identity. 
20. I delete the outer necessity operator in (2p) and (2p=) for the sake of simplicity. 
21. If perdurantism is true, then persons have temporal parts as well as spatial parts, and if we conjoin 
perdurantism with mereological essentialism, the result is that a person's temporal parts are ones she 
has essentially. However, even if it is true that persons have their temporal parts essentially, it does not 
follow that the temporal parts themselves could not have differed mentally. Even if it were true that a 
4-D person could not have existed without the temporal parts she actually has, it might still be that the 
temporal parts themselves could have had different mental features. 
22. Campbell (2000, p. 48) proposes that the advocate of a psychological account of personal identity 
should agree with Parfit that identity is not what matters in survival while holding the minimalist view 
that for any actual person, x, and any y in another possible world, y has what matters to x's survival 
if y is psychologically similar to x (with the qualification that after x's death what matters is not psy 
chological similarity to x, but that there is a person R-related to y). However, even if we accept this 
minimalist view about what matters in survival, we need not?and it seems we should not?accept it 
as a view about personal identity. 
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